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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1948, Ignatz Mezei decided to visit his dying mother.
He left his home in Buffalo and set sail for Europe to care for her. 1 Mr. Mezei
had lived in upstate New York for a quarter century. 2 During World War II,
Mr. Mezei exercised his civic duty on behalf of the United States,
volunteering his time and energy to help the American war effort. He worked
for the U.S. Coast Guard, served as an air raid warden, donated blood, and
sold war bonds. 3 But after the war, he experienced great difficulty in
navigating postwar Europe, and found himself unable to enter Romania to
visit his dying mother. So, Mr. Mezei secured an immigration quota visa
from the American consulate in Budapest and sailed back to the United
States to return to his wife and home. 4
Upon his arrival at Ellis Island, immigration inspectors told a very
different story. In their eyes, Mr. Mezei was not a civic-minded, starspangled Buffalo resident, but a stranger of mysterious origin, ostensibly

1

Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); United
States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev’d, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
2 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
3 Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. at 67.
4 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
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born in Gibraltar to parents of Romanian or Hungarian descent. 5 They
accused him of having joined a communist cell that operated under the
direction of the Communist Party when he first came to the United States in
1924. 6 They claimed that he harbored communist sympathies and served as
the secretary and president of the Buffalo chapter of the communist
propaganda machine. 7 The Supreme Court characterized his trip to Europe
as a curious disappearance behind the Iron Curtain. 8 The Attorney General
determined that Mr. Mezei’s release into the United States after returning
from Europe would be prejudicial to the public interest, and ordered his
exclusion from the country. 9 Mr. Mezei was promptly detained in the
Communist Ward at Ellis Island until the government could effectuate his
departure. 10
After his final order of removal, Mr. Mezei tried—and failed—to depart
Ellis Island for another country. He applied for admission to over a dozen
European, Latin American, and South American countries. Every country
refused his application. 11 Mezei was “likely to be detained indefinitely,
perhaps for life, for a cause known only to the Attorney General.” 12
Later courts have read Mezei as a command of judicial deference in
cases where a noncitizen is subjected to indefinite civil detention when trying
to enter the United States. 13 Just as Mr. Mezei was condemned to languish in

5

Id.
Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen
Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 972–73 (1995).
7 Id. at 974–75.
8 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214.
9 Id. at 208.
10 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 971.
11 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219–20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson remarked that since the United
States had adjudged Mezei a “Samson who might pull down the pillars of our temple,” it is not surprising
that other, “less strongly established and less stable” countries would refuse to admit him. Id. at 220.
12 Id. at 220. After nearly four years of detention, the government quietly released him as it closed
down Ellis Island. Richard A. Serrano, Detained, Without Details, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2003, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-nov-01-na-ignatz1-story.html [https://perma.cc/4HEUZNWF].
13 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that the
holding of Mezei should be expanded to control cases involving noncitizens who are firmly within the
territory of the United States and wish to remain); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Mezei
in stating that Congress’s legislative power is at its height when determining the admissibility of
noncitizens); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 (1972) (citing Mezei in noting that the
“Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle [of judicial deference to Congress and the President in
the immigration context] have been legion”). In a recent Third Circuit case involving families seeking to
avoid expedited removal from the United States, the court held that Mezei controlled. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 443 (3d Cir. 2016). Notably, this case traced the arc of the Supreme
6

1633

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

an Ellis Island jail cell for the rest of his life, migrants today can be subjected
to indefinite civil detention for years at a time, all without being able to see
a judge to contest their detention. 14
This Note focuses on the permissiveness of indefinite civil detention in
American immigration law. It draws on analogies to early modern English
debtors’ prisons and involuntary civil commitment in the substance abuse
crisis to argue that the Supreme Court should recognize that indefinite civil
detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is not actually
civil—it is functionally criminal.
Indefinite civil detention, and the accompanying human toll, continues
through to today. 15 Hours before taking the stage in Orlando, Florida for the
official kickoff of his reelection campaign, 16 President Trump took to Twitter
to ignite debate on his signature issue of immigration. The President unveiled
a major deportation operation, announcing that “[n]ext week, ICE
[Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] will begin the process of
removing the millions of illegal aliens 17 who have illicitly found their way
into the United States.” 18 The announcement blindsided senior ICE

Court’s plenary power cases, finding that Mezei rolled back earlier cases that were friendlier to
noncitizens. Id.
14 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012); see also Kelsey Lutz, The Implications of
Jennings v. Rodriguez on Immigration Detention Policy, MINN. L. REV. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://minnesotalawreview.org/2019/02/04/the-implications-of-jennings-v-rodriguez-on-immigrationdetention-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8XJK-GAX5] (“[T]housands of [noncitizens] each year [are] detained
pursuant to a series of immigration statutes requiring mandatory detention . . . .”); Domenico Montanaro
et al., Supreme Court Ruling Means Immigrants Could Continue to Be Detained Indefinitely, NPR (Feb.
27, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589096901/supreme-court-ruling-meansimmigrants-can-continue-to-be-detained-indefinitely [https://perma.cc/ZN3H-FN7B] (“The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled . . . that immigrants, even those with permanent legal status and asylum seekers, do
not have the right to periodic bond hearings.”).
15 Albeit without the intrigue and espionage that colored the facts of Mezei.
16 Maggie Haberman et al., Trump, at Rally in Florida, Kicks Off His 2020 Re-election Bid, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/us/politics/donald-trump-rallyorlando.html [https://perma.cc/AJ7E-ANNH].
17 The terms used to describe noncitizens vary widely and can be politically charged. When quoting
or discussing a source, this Note will use whatever term is supplied in the source material. When
discussing the issue more generally, this Note will use the terms “noncitizen” or “migrant.”
18 Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 17, 2019, 6:20 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1140791400658870274 [https://perma.cc/5VCZ-TYQX].
Days later, President Trump delayed the operation for two weeks, announcing that the operation would
go forward barring legislative overhaul from Congress. Christian Vasquez, Trump Delays ICE
Deportation Raids Hours After Defending Them, POLITICO (June 22, 2019, 10:24 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/22/trump-defends-immigration-actions-1376706
[https://perma.cc/RH9M-9HRR].
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officials 19 and enraged congressional Democrats. 20 Most importantly, it put
immigrants in a state of fear, racing to understand their rights and what might
happen to them. 21
Many immigrants fear civil detention, the deprivation of liberty for
noncriminal purposes. 22 Individuals held in civil detention may never have
been charged with a crime. 23 Civil detainees are held in facilities that are
often indistinguishable from criminal detention centers. 24 Civil detention is
a central feature of American immigration law, 25 used as a means of
effectuating the removal of immigrants or maintaining custody of
immigrants pending court actions. 26
The same week President Trump announced the ICE operation, news
articles detailing the wretched conditions of immigration detention centers
drew public attention. Harrowing accounts of these centers detailed the ways
in which those detained were denied basic human necessities. Children were
19

Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Michael D. Shear, ICE Signals Mass Immigration Arrests, but Not the
‘Millions’ Trump Promised, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/
us/politics/trump-immigration-deportations.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TLC2-SQCG].
20 Vasquez, supra note 18.
21 After news of the raids broke, the ACLU and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education
and Legal Services published posts on social media aimed at informing immigrants of their rights should
they be approached or detained by immigration officials. Aaron Rupar et al., Trump Postpones ICE’s
Planned Deportation Raids in 10 Big Cities, VOX (June 23, 2019, 8:54 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/21/18701408/ice-deportation-raids-10-cities
[https://perma.cc/4YUP-9VU2].
22 Emily Ryo, Essay, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 238 (2019)
(“Immigration detention in the U.S. is civil confinement for which the officially stated purpose is to
facilitate the removal of individuals who do not have permission to remain in the country.”); see also Anil
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 44 (2010) (discussing the
use of civil detention as a means of depriving an individual of liberty for the noncriminal purpose of
effectuating the individual’s removal).
23 Many noncitizens detained under the mandatory detention provisions have never been charged
with a crime. Lutz, supra note 14 (noting that the categories of noncitizens detained under these statutes
include not only the criminally charged but also asylum seekers and noncitizens initially determined to
be inadmissible).
24 Kalhan, supra note 22, at 50 (“Most detention facilities . . . were designed to hold criminal suspects
and offenders, not immigration detainees, and most detention officials have experience in law
enforcement, not civil detention and alternatives to detention.”). See generally Megan Shields Casturo,
Comment, Civil Immigration Detention: When Civil Detention Turns Carceral, 122 PENN ST. L. REV.
825, 833–36 (2018) (surveying the dire conditions of privately owned detention centers, which house a
majority of ICE detainees).
25 Laurence Benenson, The Math of Immigration Detention, 2018 Update: Costs Continue to
Multiply, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (May 9, 2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/math-immigrationdetention-2018-update-costs-continue-mulitply/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6K-TTK8]; see also Ryo, supra
note 22, at 239 (“The Trump Administration has expanded immigration detention by subjecting a greater
number of individuals to detention and by making it more likely that detention will be prolonged.”).
26 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c) (2012).
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denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap. 27 In one Texas center, the
overwhelming majority did not have the opportunity to bathe for long
periods of time after entering the United States. 28 Toddlers without diapers
were left with no option but to relieve themselves in their pants. 29
While lawyers and district court judges have grappled over the
conditions in these centers, 30 the Supreme Court is wrestling with broader
questions on the issue of civil detention: What does the Constitution permit?
Who may be detained in civil detention, and for how long? How do we
understand the rights of immigrants and the permissiveness of civil
detention? With recent decisions in Jennings v. Rodriguez 31 and Nielsen v.
Preap 32 and continued hard-line immigration policies from the Trump
Administration, 33 civil detention has become a prominent question for the
Court. Neither of these recent cases addressed the constitutional
permissiveness of the indefinite civil detention of migrants, and cases raising
this question are percolating in the lower courts. 34
This Note draws on history and comparative analysis to argue that the
indefinite detention of immigrants should be considered a criminal rather
than a civil process, and that those detained are therefore owed a modicum
of due process that they do not currently receive. The Note proceeds in four
Parts. Part I traces the history of immigration law in the United States. It
27

Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant Children at a
Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-childrenborder-soap.html [https://perma.cc/6VU7-R3RB].
28 Id. For a broader discussion of conditions in detention centers, see Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were
Dirty, They Were Scared, and They Were Hungry’, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorneyinterview/592540/ [https://perma.cc/H25X-R7GK].
29 Dickerson, supra note 27.
30 See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Lawyer Draws Outrage for Defending Lack of Toothbrushes in
Border Detention, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/sarah-fabianmigrant-lawyer-doj.html [https://perma.cc/6HD7-QQFP].
31 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018) (declining to rule on the constitutional issue because the Court of
Appeals ruled on statutory grounds rather than addressing the merits of the constitutional issue).
32 139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019) (ruling on statutory grounds because the respondents did not raise a
head-on constitutional challenge to the statutes).
33 See, e.g., Hannah Dreier, Trust and Consequences, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/immigration-therapy-reports-ice/
[https://perma.cc/M8HA-F64T] (detailing a Trump administration strategy that requires mental health
professionals to turn over notes from mandatory therapy sessions to immigration officials, which
professional therapy associations consider a violation of patient confidentiality).
34 Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 972; Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 851. The Supreme Court remanded Rodriguez,
and district courts are currently opining on the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (ruling that a noncitizen detained for thirty-four months under a
mandatory detention statute has a constitutional right to a bail hearing).
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surveys the origins of federal regulation, examines Supreme Court cases
defining the contours of civil detention, and discusses the origins and modern
understanding of the federal government’s plenary power over immigration.
Part II examines recent Supreme Court cases challenging the indefinite civil
detention of migrants. Part III then explores two nonimmigration civil
detention analogies: debtors’ prisons in early modern England and
involuntary civil commitment in the substance abuse crisis context. Part IV
draws on the analogies in Part III, identifies four features that help discern
civil from criminal detention, and argues that the mandatory detention
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act are functionally criminal.
I.

HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION

This Part examines the federal government’s expansive powers over
immigration. It traces the development of this power at the Supreme Court
and examines how the power has been interpreted and applied.
A.

Birth of the Plenary Power: Landmark Cases on Immigration and
the Constitution

At the time of the Founding, the United States was a nation that
welcomed open immigration and the free flow of migrants, and for over a
century, Congress did not regulate immigration. 35 The federal government’s
first major treaty in the field of immigration sought to encourage
immigration between the United States and China. 36 Over a decade of
governmentally encouraged immigration followed. The Chinese population
grew steadily in the Western States, and anti-Chinese sentiment ensued,
particularly among industrialists and politicians. 37
In response, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
suspending Chinese immigration to the United States. 38 Notably, although
this Act barred new Chinese immigrants from entering the country, it
included an express exemption allowing Chinese subjects already present in

35 Paul Brickner & Meghan Hanson, The American Dreamers: Racial Prejudices and Discrimination
as Seen Through the History of American Immigration Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 205 (2004).
36 Treaty with China, U.S-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739 (known as the Burlingame Treaty).
37 The
Burlingame-Seward
Treaty, 1868,
U.S. DEP’T ST.: OFF. HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty
[https://perma.cc/B2U9UUYL].
38 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59 (“[T]he coming of Chinese laborers to the
United States . . . is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese
laborer to come . . . to remain within the United States.”).
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the United States to leave and reenter. 39 Six years later, Congress passed
another act revoking this reentry exception, 40 barring Chinese immigrants
living in America but traveling abroad from returning to the United States,
even if they had valid reentry papers. 41 It was under this framework that
immigration law cases first reached the Supreme Court.
In 1889, the Supreme Court decided Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
the landmark case 42 that gave rise to the plenary power doctrine. The Court
upheld the 1888 Act, ruling that the “government of the United States . . .
can exclude aliens from its territory,” 43 establishing the federal government’s
plenary power over immigration. Since Chae Chan Ping, the political
branches have possessed absolute power over immigration at the border, and
Congress has continued to legislate heavily in the area of immigration. 44 The
source of authority for the plenary power has not materially changed since
Chae Chan Ping. In justifying the plenary power, the Court still uses what
essentially amounts to a penumbral analysis, 45 drawing on a mosaic of
disparate enumerated powers to create a reservoir of authority 46 that imbues
39 Id. § 3 (specifying that the prohibition “shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United
States” at the time the treaty took effect).
40 Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
41 This statutory framework forbidding the reentry of resident aliens echoes through centuries of
history to today. Consider the plight of a lawful permanent resident of the United States on an inbound
flight to America at the moment President Trump’s first travel ban took effect, which barred reentry of
lawful permanent residents. See Exec. Order No. 13769, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Jan. 27, 2017)
(superseded by Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017)).
42 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 946–51 (describing the importance of Chae Chan Ping and the
subsequent rise of the plenary power).
43 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
44 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537
(2012); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
45 The constitutional justification for the plenary power doctrine closely resembles the oft-criticized
“penumbral” analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance”). But see id. at 508–10 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s
penumbral analysis); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Metaphors: The Wall of Separation and
the Penumbra, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 488 (2011) (criticizing the penumbral analysis in privacy cases
as “intellectually confusing”); William J. Watkins, Jr., The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act: Congress
Makes a Wrong Turn, 49 S.C. L. REV. 983, 996 n.124 (1998) (“A ‘penumbra’ is a seemingly strange place
to discover constitutional guarantees.”).
46 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (supporting the plenary
power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” it necessarily
possesses a broader foreign affairs power); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Naturalization Clause) (supporting the
plenary power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may regulate which immigrants may enter the political
community via naturalization, it may also regulate which immigrants may enter the physical community,
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the federal government with plenary power over the regulation of
immigration.
In the century that followed Chae Chan Ping, the plenary power
doctrine evolved rapidly. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court held
that the federal government’s power to exclude aliens, as defined in Chae
Chan Ping, naturally extends to the power to deport aliens. 47 Importantly,
Fong Yue Ting introduced the civil/criminal distinction in immigration law.
When Fong Yue Ting argued that his expulsion violated due process, the
Court ruled that because “[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime,” but rather a noncriminal, civil action, Fong Yue Ting’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights “have no application.” 48
The Court more directly addressed the civil/criminal distinction in
Wong Wing v. United States. After finding that Wong Wing was unlawfully
present within the United States, a commissioner ordered he be imprisoned
at hard labor for sixty days and then deported from the United States. 49 Wong
Wing succeeded in arguing that imprisonment at hard labor was not a civil
punishment but rather a criminal punishment that violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a speedy and public trial.50 Although the Court had
previously affirmed the lower court rulings in Chae Chan Ping and Fong
Yue Ting, this time the Court ruled that the commissioner in Wong Wing had
gone too far. Finding that imprisonment at hard labor is a criminal
punishment, the Court ruled that the government may criminally punish an
alien only after a criminal trial that affords the alien the full panoply of rights
found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 51
i.e., immigration into the United States); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (supporting the plenary power doctrine’s
rationale that if Congress may “declare War,” it possesses a broader foreign affairs power that provides
authority for regulating immigration); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (Slave Importation Clause) (supporting the
plenary power doctrine’s rationale that if Congress may not regulate the importation of “Persons” prior
to 1808, it may do so after 1808). Needless to say, none of these enumerated powers squarely grants the
political branches the authority to regulate immigration, and plenary power proponents aggregate these
disparate enumerated powers to support the plenary power doctrine. To find the federal government’s
implied, unenumerated power to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court “listed powers that were all
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.” Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 945.
47 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). The Court relied upon the same
justification as in Chae Chan Ping, reinforcing the theory that the plenary power draws its authority from
various enumerated powers in the Constitution as well as powers that are “inherent in sovereignty.” Id. at
705 (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
48 Id. at 730.
49 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (reciting the facts of the case).
50 Id. at 233–34, 237 (majority opinion).
51 Id. at 237. Wong Wing is commonly regarded as a “crimmigration” case. Mary D. Fan, The Case
for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 105 (2013). For a discussion of the criminalization of
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In Wong Wing, the Supreme Court thus drew a line between civil
immigration laws and criminal punishment. 52 This line has endured,53
forming the basis for indefinite civil detention that is the subject of this Note.
To avoid the stringent judicial process that accompanies the criminal
treatment of noncitizens, the federal government has long cabined exclusion,
removal, and detention within the civil context. This has allowed the scope
of the plenary power to expand in more recent Supreme Court cases.
In these more recent cases, the Supreme Court has circumscribed
judicial review of the actions of the political branches in the immigration
context. 54 The plenary power pulls back the traditional constitutional
protections of due process and equal protection: so long as the government’s
exercise of this power is a civil action based on a “facially legitimate and
bona fide reason,” 55 the political branches may make laws concerning
aliens—such as the indefinite civil detention statutes—that “would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 56
B.

The Plenary Power Applied: Indefinite
Civil Detention

The Supreme Court thus established by the end of the nineteenth
century that detention of migrants is a civil matter. But saying that the
government has plenary power to enforce this penalty does not describe the
contours of that power. Furthermore, the constitutionality of this power has
been questioned by a long line of cases which have asked: Does the plenary
power permit the federal government to detain noncitizens for lengthy, often
immigration law, or “crimmigration,” see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
52 Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1576 (2008).
53 The civil/criminal distinction has recently come under scrutiny by the Supreme Court. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Damon Root,
Neil Gorsuch, Civil Asset Forfeiture, and the Original Meaning of the 14th Amendment, REASON (Dec.
4,
2018,
10:20
AM),
https://reason.com/2018/12/04/neil-gorsuch-civil-asset-forfeiture-and
[https://perma.cc/K6TK-J3RU]. At issue in Timbs was a state’s efforts to seize a criminal defendant’s
vehicle via civil asset forfeiture. The State of Indiana conceded before the Indiana Supreme Court that
this instance of civil asset forfeiture was punitive. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 48.
54 See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (ruling that the government’s exercise of the
plenary power is “largely immune from judicial control,” even in cases where the governmental action
seemingly violates equal protection or due process); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)
(articulating a standard for judicial review under the plenary power, holding that the Court will only ask
whether the government has demonstrated a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for exercising the
plenary power).
55 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769.
56 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
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indefinite periods of time without a bond hearing while the government
either determines the migrant’s admissibility 57 or tries to effectuate the
migrant’s removal? 58 This question is still alive at the Supreme Court, most
recently raised (and avoided) in Jennings v. Rodriguez 59 and Nielsen v.
Preap, 60 discussed in Part II. This Part explores the ways the Court has
addressed or avoided this question over time.
The Supreme Court first addressed this question in a pair of cases in the
early 1950s. Taken together, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 61
and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei 62 represent the high-water
mark of the plenary power doctrine. 63 In Knauff, the Court addressed the
exclusion and detention of an alien married to an American citizen. Ellen
Knauff was a German woman who fled Nazi Germany in 1939. 64 She
resettled in England as a refugee, where she served as a flight sergeant in the
British Royal Air Force during World War II. 65 She later served as a civilian
employee with the War Department of the United States 66 and married Kurt
Knauff, an American citizen and U.S. Army veteran of World War II. 67
On August 14, 1948, Ellen Knauff arrived at Ellis Island, seeking entry
and naturalization under American immigration laws and the War Brides
Act. 68 Immediately, she was temporarily excluded and subsequently detained
at Ellis Island. 69 After sitting in a jail cell for two months, Ellen Knauff
learned the unfortunate news: the Attorney General had ordered her excluded
because “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United

57 I.e., asylum seekers. Under the law, 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) (2012) mandates that asylum seekers who
establish a credible fear of persecution “shall be detained for further consideration of the application”
(emphasis added).
58 I.e., aliens who have been ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c) (2012).
59 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018).
60 139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019).
61 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
62 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
63 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 954.
64 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 955.
69 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.

1641

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

States.” 70 Denied a hearing to challenge her exclusion, Knauff filed a habeas
petition. 71
In denying her petition and condoning both her exclusion and her
indefinite civil detention on Ellis Island, the Supreme Court delivered an
enduring articulation of judicial deference in the plenary power context:
admission is a privilege, not a right. 72 As such, “[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned.” 73 With this judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized judicial
deference to the political branches’ immigration decisions, 74 a notion alive
and well in modern immigration law jurisprudence. 75 Knauff still serves as
jumping-off point for determining how much due process an alien receives. 76
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, bringing the plenary power doctrine to its zenith. Mezei
was ordered excluded under the same statute and regulations as Ellen
Knauff. 77 Writing for the Court, Justice Clark framed the issue as one of
continued exclusion: since Ignatz Mezei was a noncitizen seeking entry into
the United States, the Court would defer to the political branches’
determinations on immigration matters. 78 Citing Chae Chan Ping, Fong Yue
Ting, and Knauff as support, Justice Clark noted that exclusion is a
“fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.” 79 Mr. Mezei’s temporary
70 Id. at 539–40. The government contended that Ellen Knauff engaged in espionage while serving
in the U.S. Army’s Civil Censorship Division by supplying secrets to Czechoslovakian officials.
Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 960–61.
71 Her petition was based primarily on the War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945). Knauff,
338 U.S. at 540.
72 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (“Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United
States shall prescribe.”).
73 Id. at 544 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)).
74 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 956.
75 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2012) (noting that a “searching inquiry into the
persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with . . . the deference traditionally
accorded the President in [the immigration] sphere”).
76 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing the extremely deferential Knauff
standard before discussing the facts of the case and how much due process the respondent is afforded);
see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing the same standard).
But see Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (contrasting the scant
process due to noncitizens, for whom the “it has been possible to characterize [the] private interest [of
entering the United States] . . . as a mere privilege subject to the Executive’s plenary power” with the
more robust due process analysis afforded to the citizen-petitioner in that case).
77 Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 965.
78 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207, 213.
79 Id. at 210.
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harborage on Ellis Island did not change his status or confer any additional
rights; 80 rather, just like Ellen Knauff, Ignatz Mezei was an alien at the
doorstep of the United States seeking the privilege of admission into the
country. 81 As such, the Court applied the standard of judicial deference
articulated in Knauff. 82 Mr. Mezei had been denied entry to the United States,
but he was free to leave Ellis Island for another country at any time.83
If only that were so! In dissent, Justice Jackson recast the issue as about
exclusion rather than detention. 84 Whereas the majority opinion declared that
Mr. Mezei was free to depart the United States at any time and thus end his
indefinite civil detention on Ellis Island, Justice Jackson noted that this
would be true “if only he were an amphibian!” 85 With this rejoinder, Justice
Jackson cut through the majority opinion’s legal fiction and revealed the
practical result of the decision. In condoning Mezei’s continued detention,
the Court had elevated the plenary power to its high-water mark.
Mezei is a landmark decision in the indefinite civil detention line of
cases. Conservative justices relied on Justice Clark’s majority opinion as
controlling in future cases. 86 Liberal justices drew on Justice Jackson’s
dissenting opinion, expressing serious doubts that modern statutes

80

Id. at 215.
Id. at 212 (noting that for the purposes of rights and due process, Mezei was considered an “alien
on the threshold of initial entry”). Scholars and commentators refer to this phenomenon as the “entry
fiction.” See Zainab A. Cheema, A Constitutional Case for Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum
Seekers: Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 306 (2018).
82 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
83 Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the government’s such assertion).
84 Id. (“Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep him as
effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being the United States immigration
authority. It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law when by the commonest of common
sense he is bound.”).
85 Id.
86 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Because I believe Mezei
controls these cases, and, like the Court, I also see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional
impediment to the discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”). Some scholars read the plenary
power doctrine as historically rooted in the Court’s reticence to upset international affairs. See Peter J.
Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340 (2002). Justice Field initially
articulated this reticence in Chae Chan Ping v. United States. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“If there be any
just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department of our
government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject.”). But with the global balance of power
more stable and predictable than in centuries past, some scholars believe that the plenary power doctrine
is “historically contingent on a global system whose time is passing.” See Spiro, supra, at 340–42. This
view of the plenary power argues that, because the threat posed by judicial intervention in this area is
greatly diminished, Zadvydas might signal the Court has reason to limit the application of the plenary
power doctrine to terrorism-related cases. Id.
81
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mandating the indefinite civil detention of noncitizens could pass
constitutional muster in light of the historical significance of habeas corpus. 87
For instance, in a more recent line of cases, the Court addressed the
plenary power in the context of indefinite civil detention. In Zadvydas v.
Davis, 88 the Court considered the validity of an immigration statute 89 that
permitted the Attorney General to indefinitely detain an alien who had been
ordered removed from the country. Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident alien of the
United States, had been ordered deported to Germany following a string of
drug, theft, and battery offenses. 90 Although Zadvydas was born in a
displaced persons camp in postwar Germany, the German government did
not consider him a German citizen. 91 As a result, Mr. Zadvydas found himself
in the same legal limbo as Ignatz Mezei—not welcome in America and not
accepted anywhere else. Like Mr. Mezei, Mr. Zadvydas faced the prospect
of spending the rest of his life in civil detention, all without ever having the
chance to challenge his detention.
Although the government argued that Mezei controlled, authorizing Mr.
Zadvydas’s continued civil detention without a bond hearing, 92 the Court
distinguished Mr. Zadvydas’s circumstances from Mr. Mezei’s. Whereas
Mezei’s harborage on Ellis Island did not count as entry into the United
States, 93 permitting the Court to treat him as if he had been “stopped at the
border” 94 for constitutional purposes, Mr. Zadvydas was firmly within the
interior of the United States. His presence within the country placed Mr.
Zadvydas on different legal footing, providing him with more constitutional
protections than an alien requesting admission at the border.

87

See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 876 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]ince
Blackstone’s time and long before, liberty has included the right of a confined person to seek release on
bail. It is neither technical nor unusually difficult to read the words of these statutes as consistent with
this basic right.”).
88 533 U.S. at 678.
89 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). The text of this statute authorizes the Attorney General to detain a
removable alien indefinitely beyond the ninety-day removal period established in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A).
90 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 692 (“The Government argues that, from a constitutional perspective, alien status itself can
justify indefinite detention, and points to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei as support.” (citation
omitted)).
93 I.e., the “entry fiction.”
94 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215
(1953)); see also id. at 719–20 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer invoked the substantive canon of
constitutional avoidance 95 in addressing the detention statute. Rather than
strike the statute in its entirety, Justice Breyer read it to include an implicit
six-month limit on the civil detention of aliens. 96 Justice Breyer was careful
to note that this implicit limit does not mean that every alien must be released
after six months. 97 Rather, after six months of indefinite civil detention, an
alien is entitled to a hearing to contest his or her detention and show good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, and the burden then shifts to the government
to rebut that showing. 98 With this decision, Justice Breyer did not question
the general doctrine of the plenary power. 99 Instead, he relied on the
border/interior distinction to rule that the plenary power does not permit the
federal government to condemn an alien already present in the United States
to an indefinite term of imprisonment because of the government’s inability
to effectuate that alien’s removal. 100
But in the mirror image of Justice Jackson in Mezei, Justice Scalia
reframed the issue in Zadvydas. In his view, this case was not about
detention; it was about whether an alien like Mr. Zadvydas—who has no
legal right to be in the country—has a constitutional right to be released into
the interior of the United States. 101 Justice Scalia rejected the Court’s attempt
to distinguish Mezei, 102 writing that Mezei should control this case,
permitting the continued indefinite civil detention of Mr. Zadvydas. 103 In
95 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
96 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Soon after the opinion, scholars argued that because Zadvydas reads more naturally as a case about
fundamental justice than principled constitutional reasoning, it does not signal the demise of the plenary
power doctrine. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 386 (2002) (“Zadvydas, then, reads like some of the
important Warren Court opinions. Pursuing a just goal against the backdrop of unfriendly precedents, it
reaches, compromises, and confounds on the way to a value-laden result . . . . [I]f the sun were directly
overhead, it will shine brightly but cast almost no shadow.”).
100 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
101 Id. at 702–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Although the ruling in Zadvydas affords migrants squarely within the United States a bond
hearing every six months, scholars have found it significant that the Court did not reconsider or overrule
Mezei. In distinguishing Mezei rather than overturning it, the opinion in Zadvydas “preserves a
foundational case in the plenary power edifice[,]” signaling that Zadvydas is not the demise of the plenary
power doctrine. Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 374.
103 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress undoubtedly thought that both
groups of aliens—inadmissible aliens at the threshold and criminal aliens under final order of removal—
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doing so, Justice Scalia’s dissent revived Mezei as an authoritative statement
of the plenary power 104—over aliens detained at the border as well as aliens
detained within the interior of the United States.105
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the Court has held that the
federal government has plenary power to “temporarily” indefinitely detain
migrants at the border or pending deportation. The key fact upon which the
Court’s analysis has turned is that such detention is civil, not criminal. This
Note now examines the most recent cases to present these issues at the
Supreme Court, wherein the Court avoided addressing the constitutionality
of such detentions, restricting its analysis to textual interpretation of the laws
at issue.
II. JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ & NIELSEN V. PREAP
So far, this Note has surveyed landmark cases that have shaped the
contours of the plenary power. These cases are not only consequential—they
are also deeply personal. In each case—Chae Chan Ping, Wong Wing,
Knauff, Mezei, Zadvydas—the Court considered the plenary power and
indefinite civil detention in the context of a detailed personal narrative—a
war bride hoping to reunite with her husband; 106 a Buffalo family man who
just wanted to go home; 107 a stateless convict with nowhere to go.108 Justice
could be constitutionally detained on the same terms . . . . Because I believe Mezei controls these cases,
and, like the Court, I also see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional impediment to the
discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General.”).
104 Surveying immigration cases after Zadvydas, namely the travel ban case, other scholars suggest
that the plenary power is in retreat, or perhaps just less visible in Supreme Court opinions, due to changing
views of the doctrine’s historical roots in racism and xenophobia. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto & Rachel
Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of National Security, 128 YALE L.J. F. 688, 719–21 (2019)
(“Without saying so explicitly, the Court in Trump [v. Hawaii] invoked . . . plenary power over
immigration by citing three older cases embracing that doctrine . . . . Changing legislative, judicial, and
public views of human rights and racism have undercut the doctrine’s reach and standing—a likely reason
the Trump majority invoked its tenets without explicitly naming it.” (footnote omitted)).
105 Two years after Zadvydas, the Court took up another case involving a mandatory civil detention
statute. In Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court upheld an immigration statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), that mandated the detention of certain aliens pending their removal. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service ordered Hyung Joon Kim deported, and Kim was detained pending his
removal. Id. at 513. This detention lasted six months. Id. at 531. In upholding the mandatory detention
statute, the Court stressed the temporary nature of Kim’s detention: unlike Zadvydas’s detention, which
was “‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’” Kim’s detention was shorter in duration, and only
stretched on for six months because Kim had requested a continuance. Id. If Kim had not done so, the
government would have been able to more quickly effectuate Kim’s removal and thus end his civil
detention.
106 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539 (1950).
107 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953).
108 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
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Jackson found it “fortunate[]” that in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
America, it was still “startling” to find a person held indefinitely without
accusation of crime or a judicial trial. 109
Twenty-first-century America is not so fortunate. Changes in the
immigration law landscape have precipitated a dramatic increase in the
number of migrants facing indefinite civil detention. 110 To counter the uptick
in illegal immigration, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 111 into law, expanding the
federal government’s authority to indefinitely detain select classes of
aliens. 112 Jennings v. Rodriguez 113 and Nielsen v. Preap 114 arose in this
regulatory landscape.
A.

Jennings v. Rodriguez

Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident
of the United States, was convicted of drug and theft offenses in 2004. 115 The
government detained Rodriguez under one of the mandatory civil detention
statutes pending his removal. 116 After three years of incarceration,
Rodriguez—alongside a class of similarly situated lawful permanent
residents—filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention. 117
Rodriguez argued that the mandatory civil detention statutes 118 do not
authorize lengthy civil detention without a bond hearing. 119 Unlike prior civil
detention cases like Mezei and Zadvydas, Jennings was a class action suit on
behalf of thousands of noncitizens subjected to indefinite civil detention,

109

Mezei, 345 U.S. at 218 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Melinda Juárez et al., Twenty Years After IIRIRA: The Rise of Immigrant Detention and Its Effects
on Latinx Communities Across the Nation, 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 74, 76–77 (2018).
111 Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
112 Memorandum from President William Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Deterring Illegal Immigration, 60 Fed. Reg. 28, 7885, 7887 (Feb. 10, 1995) (“The
Administration’s deterrence strategy includes strengthening the country’s detention and deportation
capability. No longer will criminals and other high risk deportable aliens be released back into
communities because of a shortage of detention space and ineffective deportation procedures.”).
113 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
114 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
115 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838.
116 Id. Rodriguez was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
117 Id.
118 Namely, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c).
119 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838; see also Miriam Peguero Medrano, Not Yet Gone, and Not Yet
Forgotten: The Reasonableness of Continued Mandatory Detention of Noncitizens Without a Bond
Hearing, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 621 (2018) (summarizing Jennings’s procedural posture).
110
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underscoring the now-widespread nature of civil detention in immigration
law. 120
In the Ninth Circuit, Alejandro Rodriguez argued that prolonged
mandatory detention without any possibility of review by a neutral arbiter
raised grave constitutional concerns. 121 Drawing on Justice Breyer’s decision
in Zadvydas, Rodriguez asked the Ninth Circuit to read the relevant statutory
provisions to require a bond hearing when an alien’s detention exceeds six
months. 122 The Ninth Circuit did exactly that.123 The court engaged in
constitutional avoidance, construing the statute to contain an implicit sixmonth limit on detention, after which aliens would be able to challenge the
validity of their continued detention. 124
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Alito reversed the Ninth Circuit
and remanded the case.125 While acknowledging that the statutes pose
constitutional concerns, Justice Alito remarked that constitutional avoidance
is only appropriate when the language is susceptible to multiple plausible
interpretations. 126 Reviewing the language of the relevant statutory
provisions, Justice Alito found that the plain text of these provisions is
unambiguous, mandating civil detention for select classes of aliens. 127 Since
the language of these provisions does not permit the sort of ambiguity found

120

See The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Leading Cases: Federal Statutes: Immigration and
Nationality Act, 132 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2018). Jennings was a class action suit on behalf of
aliens detained pursuant to four statutory provisions. The first provision—§ 1225(b)—applied to asylum
seekers. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“If the officer determines at the time of the interview that
an alien has a credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained
for further consideration of the application for asylum.” (emphasis added)). The second provision—
§ 1226(c)—applies to aliens convicted of certain enumerated crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(B) (“The
Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is inadmissible by reason of having committed
any offense covered in [various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act] . . . [or] is deportable
by reason of having committed any offense covered in [various sections of the Immigration and
Nationality Act] . . . .” (emphasis added)). The third provision—§ 1226(a)—applies to immigrants facing
removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”).
The final provision—§ 1231(a)—applies to immigrants who have been ordered removed from the
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the
alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an
alien . . . .”).
121 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2013).
122 Id. at 1132, 1138.
123 Id. at 1146.
124 Id. at 1133.
125 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 848.
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in the Zadvydas statute, 128 the Court held that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to
read in a six-month limit on civil detention. 129 Justice Alito went so far as to
suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute tortures the
text. 130 Notably, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether these
mandatory detention provisions can pass constitutional muster. Because the
Ninth Circuit decided Jennings on a textual basis, the Court found no
occasion to consider the respondents’ constitutional arguments. 131
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer first responded to the majority’s
reading of the statute. Justice Breyer found that the majority’s reading of the
detention statute—as prohibiting an alien from obtaining a bail hearing to
seek release from civil detention—raised grave doubts about the statute’s
constitutionality, even against the backdrop of the plenary power.132 Justice
Breyer addressed the respondents’ constitutional arguments, drawing on
Anglo-American history in his opinion. 133 Justice Breyer noted that because
they are denied an opportunity to challenge their detention and seek release
via a bond hearing, aliens subjected to these provisions are deprived of
liberty without due process of law. 134
Importantly, Justice Breyer acknowledged the limitations of the AngloAmerican historical argument in the civil detention context. 135 Most of the
historical cases he cited involve criminal proceedings; on the other hand,
128

The Court distinguished 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) from the detention statute at
issue in Zadvydas, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) uses the word “may,” permitting,
but not requiring, the Attorney General to detain aliens ordered removed from the country. Jennings,
138 S. Ct. at 844; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed . . . may be detained.”
(emphasis added)). While the use of the word “may” allowed the Zadvydas court to find ambiguity in the
statute, the detention statutes at issue in Jennings use the word “shall,” requiring the Attorney General to
detain certain classes of aliens. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“[T]he
alien shall be detained . . . .” (emphasis added)).
129 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851.
130 Id. at 848 (“[T]he dissent evidently has a strong stomach when it comes to inflicting linguistic
trauma [upon the words of Congress].”).
131 Id. at 851.
132 Id. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401
(1916)).
133 Id. (“The Due Process Clause—itself reflecting the language of the Magna Carta—prevents
arbitrary detention.”).
134 Id. (citing to Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896)); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
135 Justice Breyer notes that there are not many different forms of civil detention. Jennings, 138 S.
Ct. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). After discussing the Anglo-American history of providing a bail
hearing to detained individuals, Justice Breyer acknowledges that “[t]he cases before us, however, are not
criminal cases. Does that fact make a difference? The problem is that there are not many instances of civil
confinement . . . . Mental illness does sometimes provide an example. Individuals dangerous to
themselves or others may be confined involuntarily to a mental hospital.” Id.
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aliens indefinitely detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act are
subjected to civil detention. 136 To blunt this counterargument, Justice Breyer
analogized to cases involving the involuntary confinement of persons
suffering from mental illness. 137 Although these individuals do not possess
“what we could call ‘a right to a bail hearing,’” they nevertheless have the
equivalent right to a hearing prior to confinement, as well as the right to
challenge their detention at least annually.138 In Justice Breyer’s view, the
same rationale should apply in the context of mandatory civil detention of
aliens. 139 Based on this analogy and the historical importance of the right to
seek bail in the Anglo-American tradition, Justice Breyer would have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute, affording aliens the right
to challenge their detention and seek bail if their detention extends longer
than six months. 140
The cases that formed the Jennings class action suit are currently
percolating on remand. As early as December 2018, lower courts have begun
issuing rulings on the constitutional issue of whether the plenary power
authorizes the indefinite detention of certain classes of aliens without the
opportunity to seek bail. 141 The Supreme Court will face these circumstances
again—and this time, they will likely need to address the constitutional
question.

136

Id.
Id. at 864. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Jennings analogizes to involuntary hospitalization to better
understand the importance of bail hearings. This Note engages in a similar exercise to understand the
permissiveness of involuntary civil detention.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 876 (“I would read the statutory words as consistent with, indeed as requiring protection of,
the basic right to seek bail.”).
141 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding Jennings to the
district court to decide the constitutional issue, citing approvingly to Zadvydas and United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and suggesting that the detention statutes are unconstitutional by noting
that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception”
(quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755)); Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(ruling in favor of a noncitizen detained under one of these provisions, holding that “34 months of
detention is too long without an opportunity for bail”). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit excerpted a quote
from Justice Breyer’s dissent in Jennings that highlights the Magna Carta argument. The lower court
seems to think that the historical argument is one of Mr. Rodriguez’s best arguments. The three-judge
panel also hints at an originalist lens, claiming that the framers would likely have found this
unconstitutional. Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257.
137
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B.

Nielsen v. Preap

Just one year later, the Court decided another case examining the
application of a mandatory civil detention statute. In Nielsen v. Preap,142
litigants challenged the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest aliens who have committed certain
crimes “when [they were] released” from criminal custody and to place them
into civil detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing.143 In this case,
Preap argued—and the Ninth Circuit agreed—that this mandatory detention
applies only when an alien is arrested and detained immediately after he or
she is released from criminal custody. 144 The respondents in this case had
committed certain crimes covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); however, they
were not arrested immediately after their release from criminal custody.145
Some were not arrested until several years later. 146 In short, these plaintiffs
were not challenging the constitutionality of these mandatory detention
provisions; rather, they contended that these provisions should not apply to
them because of the significant lag time between their release from criminal
custody and their civil detention. This lag time, in their reading of the statute,
does not qualify as an arrest “when . . . released” from criminal custody. 147
Justice Alito, again writing for the Court, overturned the Ninth Circuit
on textual grounds and ruled that the mandatory detention provision of
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) applied to the respondents. 148 The several-year lag time
between Preap’s release from criminal custody and his arrest and detention
by immigration officials did not bar the government from applying the
statute and holding him in civil detention. 149 Having again decided a
mandatory civil detention case on textual grounds, the Court did not reach
the merits of the constitutionality of the provision itself. The Court did,
however, acknowledge the elephant in the room, noting that “[w]hile
respondents might have raised a head-on constitutional challenge to
§ 1226(c), they did not. Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory
provision does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional
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139 S. Ct. 954 (2019).
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018); Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 960.
144 Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 961.
145 Id.
146 Id. Mony Preap, the lead plaintiff in the case, had not been detained by immigration officials until
seven years after his release from criminal custody. Id.
147 Id. at 964.
148 Id. at 964–65.
149 For the Court’s extensive discussion of the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), see id. at 964. The Court’s
textual analysis of § 1226(c) is not relevant to the subject of this Note.
143
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challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read it.”150 In short,
the Court noted that Preap is a narrow decision that only addresses the
statutory construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 151 Given the proper vehicle,152
the Court indicated it will consider the constitutional issue.
In dissent, Justice Breyer again countered the Court’s textual analysis,
and again explored the historical argument, suggesting that because the right
to a bail hearing is so deeply ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
statutes that deny a person this important right will likely fail constitutional
muster. 153 Specifically responding to Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence
urging that the issue before the court is “narrow,” 154 Justice Breyer indicated
that the Court cannot continue to punt on the constitutional issue. Since the
Court cannot decide these issues without considering the “basic American
legal value[]” of the right to not be deprived of liberty without due process,
the Court will eventually need to rule on the constitutionality of these
provisions. 155
III. ANALOGS OF MODERN CIVIL DETENTION
This Part of the Note seeks to answer the question: where else in history
do we see institutions that resemble civil detention, and how, if at all, does it
help us better understand civil detention in the modern American
immigration system? In studying these analogies, this Note seeks to detail
the context and legal bases of these forms of detention, and to examine
whether, despite the limits of these comparisons, they are instructive
regarding the civil detention of migrants.
A.

Debtors’ Prisons in Early Modern England: Proto-Civil Detention

A skeptical reader might initially question the value of examining
debtors’ prisons as an analogy to modern civil detention of migrants in the
American immigration system. Debtors’ prisons seem, on the surface, quite
different from modern civil detention of migrants—they existed in a different
country and were abolished a long time ago. 156 Nevertheless, history is one
150

Id. at 972.
Id.
152 I.e., Jennings returning to the Supreme Court.
153 Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 976, 985 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 973 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 985 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156 Although debtors’ prisons were abolished over a century ago in England, some scholars argue
that they have come roaring back in modern America, with hundreds of thousands of individuals jailed
in pretrial detention due to inability to pay cash bail. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/
151
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of the best tools available to grapple with the issues of today. 157 And as this
Note reveals, how debtors’ prisons worked and the reasons they were
abolished hold lessons for the topic at hand.
Imprisonment in a debtors’ prison followed a civil action between two
private individuals. When a creditor sought to recover debts owed to him by
a debtor, he could have the debtor detained in a debtors’ prison until the
debtor could pay. 158 Imprisonment for debt was thus technically a civil action
between two private citizens that resulted in the use of state resources—the
state maintained the facilities and detained debtors on behalf of creditors.159
Under this regime, the British legal system did not technically permit
imprisonment for debt; rather, debtors were “committed” to a debtors’ prison
for contempt of court for failing to pay a creditor. 160
Imprisonment for debt involved lengthy, indefinite stays in prison.
Legally speaking, a debtor could terminate the imprisonment by paying the
debt and satisfying the creditor. 161 Of course, the ability of the debtor to
voluntarily end their confinement was a fiction for those who lacked the
ability to pay. As a result, the British Attorney General noted that
imprisonment for debt was “the power which a creditor had to imprison a
debtor for an unlimited time until the debt was paid.” 162 One historian
detailed the fate of a woman who died in prison after forty-five years of
[https://perma.cc/4KEU-72BS]. See generally Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/debtors-prisonsthen-and-now-faq [https://perma.cc/7J2B-DBWR] (arguing debtors’ prisons live on today with
Americans jailed for failure to pay private debts as well as debts accrued through involvement in the
criminal justice system, such as public defender fees and DNA testing fees).
157 As Winston Churchill once said, “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look
forward.” OXFORD ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 6th ed. 2018) (ebook). Justice Jackson
understood the value of historical analysis, citing to the context of the Magna Carta to understand the
importance of freedom from arbitrary detention in the Anglo-American legal tradition. Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Executive imprisonment
has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should
be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land.”). He also drew on more modern history, namely his experience as the American prosecutor at
Nuremberg. In reflecting on the fate of Ignatz Mezei, Justice Jackson saw strong overtones of the
travesties of Nazi Germany’s judicial system. Jackson likened Mezei’s indefinite civil detention without
a judicial hearing to the Third Reich’s system of “protective custody,” in which the arrested “could claim
no judicial or other hearing process.” Id. at 225–26.
158 Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 155–56 (1982).
159 See id.
160 Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
351, 355–56 (2014) (explaining the technical legal basis for imprisonment for debt).
161 Cohen, supra note 158, at 155–56.
162 197 Parl Deb HC (4th ser.) (1869) col. 421.
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imprisonment for a debt of £19. 163 Whereas other European countries had
mostly enacted legislation limiting imprisonment for debt to one year,
debtors in England had no such relief. 164
In addition to lengthy prison stays, imprisonment for debt was notorious
for wretched conditions in state-sponsored prisons. 165 By the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, approximately 10,000 Englishmen were
imprisoned for debt annually under horrid conditions. 166
Although members of all social classes filled debtors’ prisons,
conditions varied greatly. Whereas wealthier and better-connected debtors
could pay to be transferred to prisons with more pleasant conditions, poorer
debtors lived in squalor, facing illness, hunger, and death. 167 The poorest of
the poor faced starvation and disease. 168 Large numbers of debtors were
crammed into small spaces—in one ward of the Marshalsea Prison, thirtytwo men occupied a sixteen-by-fourteen foot cell. 169 Such conditions resulted
in a horrid stench, and on summer nights, some debtors “perished for want
of Air.” 170
Debtors’ prisons also blurred the line between civil and criminal law.
Imprisonment for debt dates back to the thirteenth century. 171 As such, one
historian argued that it is “a relic of the time when there was no clear
distinction between civil and criminal law.” 172 This indistinct division
between the civil and the criminal endured for centuries. In Marshalsea
Prison, populations were mixed, with the criminally convicted serving their

163

Bruce Kercher, The Transformation of Imprisonment for Debt in England, 1828 to 1838, at
2 AUSTL. J.L. & SOC’Y 60, 65 (1984).
164 ROGER LEE BROWN, A HISTORY OF THE FLEET PRISON, LONDON 108 (1996).
165 Although many debtors’ prisons were privately operated and for-profit, they were functionally
public institutions, akin to modern-day private prisons, contracted by the government. See Jerry White,
Pain and Degradation in Georgian London: Life in the Marshalsea Prison, 68 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 69,
71 (2009) (“Next to churches, prisons were the most important public buildings in the metropolis. . . .
[T]heir even greater importance to the body politic demanded that prisons be rebuilt before the churches
or almost any other public institution after the Great Fire.”).
166 Ware, supra note 160, at 352; see also White, supra note 165 (detailing the wretched living
conditions inside Marshalsea, a prison notorious for poor treatment of debtors).
167 Kercher, supra note 163, at 64.
168 White, supra note 165, at 82–83.
169 Id. at 69.
170 Id.
171 Cohen, supra note 158, at 154.
172 Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 27 (1926).
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sentences in the very same prisons as innocent debtors.173 Frequently, debtors
were treated far worse than actual criminals.174
Compassionate humanitarians and evangelicals campaigned for reform
and abolition, believing that lengthy prison stays under horrific conditions
confused innocent debtors with guilty criminals. An eighteenth century
philanthropist released a report on the state of prisons, drawing public
attention to imprisoned debtors, “the most pitiable objects in our gaols
[jails].” 175 In response, prisoner welfare charities assisted “innocent” debtors,
working to secure their releases. 176 One notable such charity was the
Thatched House Society. This charity focused on obtaining the release of
“petty-sum” debtors, and was successful in liberating over 15,000 debtors in
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. 177 Another such compassionate
charity succeeded in releasing tens of thousands of imprisoned debtors,
demonstrating that “social opinion was outraged by [imprisonment for debt]
and there was public clamor for reform.” 178
The issue soon percolated through the halls of government. As early as
1790, some members of the House of Commons “felt that it was a disgrace
to have imprisonment for debt in a civilised nation, the true law of the land
having been perverted by practice.” 179 Over the ensuing decades, various
British governmental committees studied the issue of imprisonment for
private debts. 180
Parliament then engaged in a series of debates on the issue, articulating
their reasons for abolishing imprisonment for debt. 181 British lawmakers who
sought reform focused on how this system confused innocent debtors—
imprisoned due to misfortune, exploitation by creditors, or simply poverty—
with guilty criminals. During debate on the Debtors Act of 1869, one
Member of Parliament reflected this sentiment, insisting that “the man who

173

White, supra note 165, at 71.
Kercher, supra note 163, at 67.
175 Id. at 62 (“Howard’s were the first and most important of many revelations of prison conditions,
which were to raise awareness about civil prisoners. That awareness [fueled] the abolition campaigns.”).
176 Id.
177 Cohen, supra note 158, at 163. This society went so far as to work with a debtor’s creditor to
release the debtor from existing liability as well. Id.
178 Ware, supra note 160, at 353 (quoting a 1969 government report on the issue).
179 Kercher, supra note 163, at 66.
180 Id. at 74–93.
181 It is important to note that reform- and abolition-minded Victorians made a wide array of
arguments for change, including constitutional arguments, utilitarian arguments, and, as this Note
emphasizes, humanitarian and fairness arguments. Id. at 62–74. Commercial and aristocratic interests
remained a powerful roadblock to reform. Id. at 66–67.
174
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was merely unfortunate should not be regarded or treated as a criminal.” 182
Another lawmaker argued that the practice of imprisoning debtors
“confounded the innocent with the guilty.” 183 They squarely addressed the
legal fiction underpinning this entire system: “[T]he plea here that the
imprisonment was not for debt but for contempt of Court was a transparent
fiction.” 184 Debtors, they thought, were not really being detained for
contempt, but punished for debt, “for penal imprisonment it was.” 185
Parliament thus passed the Debtors Act of 1869, which largely abolished
imprisonment of debtors. The Act provided that “no person shall be arrested
or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money.” 186
Parliament did, however, retain one exception to the general abolition of
imprisonment for debtors: Section 5 of the Act retained imprisonment for
debtors who had the resources to pay but nevertheless refused. 187
Then, as now, civil detention in a state prison facility improperly
conflated civil with criminal law. Although civil detention of migrants is
ostensibly a form of civil detention, the legal fiction is unconvincing. In civil
detention of migrants, as in Victorian debtors’ prisons, the state uses
government facilities to detain (imprison) migrants for lengthy, 188 sometimes
indefinite, periods of time. In both types of detention, state resources are used
to restrict the liberty of competent people who are not being detained for
having committed a crime, but for breaking a civil statute. 189 In neither case
is there an inquiry into why the person meets the standard for confinement,
only that they do meet that standard. 190 Even the conditions in certain
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) facilities could easily be confused

182

(1969).
183

P.E. Rock, Civil Debtors: The Report of the Payne Committee, 9 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 398, 399

194 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 776.
197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 572.
185 197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 421.
186 Debtors Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (Eng.).
187 Id. (providing that courts may imprison debtors “for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until
payment of the sum due . . . [p]rovided . . . that the person making default either has or has had since the
date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum”).
188 Compare Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 860–61 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
statistics on migrants being detained for years on end without a bond hearing), with supra notes 163–164
and accompanying text.
189 Compare Lutz, supra note 14 (noting that the mandatory detention statutes apply even to migrants
who have not been charged with a crime, such as asylum seekers), with Cohen, supra note 158, at 155
(detailing the technically noncriminal nature of imprisonment for debt).
190 See generally Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (holding that §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not
afford detained migrants the right to periodic bond hearings).
184
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with those of Victorian debtors’ prisons, 191 and these conditions are not
themselves aimed at rectifying the reason for which the person is being
detained. And most importantly, in neither situation is there any real
possibility of alleviating the confinement, since the conditions for release
cannot always be met. 192
B.

Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Substance Abuse Crisis

There is another category of civil detention that provides an instructive
analogy to the civil detention of migrants: civil commitment of individuals
suffering from addiction or mental illness. As the opioid crisis deepens, civil
commitment has become a more pronounced and controversial policy
response. Individuals with Substance Use Disorder (SUD) may be
involuntarily committed and hospitalized. Thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia have civil commitment laws that cover the civil
commitment of individuals suffering from alcoholism and SUD. 193
Roughly a century of case law supplies the legal foundation for
involuntary civil commitment. As early as 1905, the Supreme Court held that
the states may use their police powers to abridge individual autonomy in
order to protect the health and safety of citizens. 194 Decades later, the
Supreme Court decided Robinson v. California, a case in which a defendant
was arrested and sentenced to jail time for violating a state statute that made
it a crime to be addicted to narcotics.195 Although the Court ruled that a state
cannot criminalize the status of drug addiction, a state may effectuate
“involuntary confinement” treatment programs “in the interest of the general
health and welfare” of the public.196 The Court’s subsequent ruling in
191

Compare Dickerson, supra note 27, with 195 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 173 (“In White
cross Street Prison . . . the County Court debtors were imprisoned in something like the cages for wild
beasts at the Zoological Gardens . . . .”), and White, supra note 165, at 69 (detailing the conditions of
debtors’ prisons).
192 Debtors languished in prison for years if they could not afford to pay their debt. See Ware, supra
note 160, at 355 (differentiating between recalcitrant debtors who could refuse to pay their debt with poor
debtors who truly could not afford to). Likewise, detention is mandatory under the immigration
provisions, and there are limited ways that a migrant can be released from detention. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 24–25, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204). At oral argument,
counsel for the government conceded that options for release are limited and caused laughter in the
courtroom after suggesting that a detained migrant “always has the option of terminating the detention by
accepting a final order of removal and returning home.”
193 Ish P. Bhalla et al., The Role of Civil Commitment in the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
343, 343 (2018).
194 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
195 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
196 Id. at 664–65.
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O’Connor v. Donaldson imposes two requirements on such involuntary
confinement programs: the involuntarily confined individual must be
dangerous to himself or others, or must be incapable of caring for his own
needs by himself or with the help of friends and family. 197 That is, the state
cannot civilly commit an individual suffering from substance abuse or
mental illness unless they have to.
Involuntary civil commitment laws vary by jurisdiction, but they share
substantial similarities in the legal process leading up to involuntary civil
commitment. Generally, a medical professional must examine the individual
and certify in writing that the individual requires intensive treatment for his
or her condition. 198 Typically, a showing must be made that the individual is
gravely disabled, dangerous to himself or others, incapacitated, unable to
manage his personal affairs and basic needs, or that the individual is
suffering from a “loss of control.” 199 Family members are the most common
petitioners. 200 Lastly, due process considerations demand that the committed
individual receive a judicial hearing within a short period of time after being
committed in order to contest the commitment. 201 Taken together, this body
of law undergirds the constitutional status of state civil commitment laws in
the United States. 202
This abridgment of individual autonomy is considered civil, not
criminal. 203 When the state commits someone for substance abuse issues, it
does so for the purpose of “provid[ing] the individual with treatment, not
punishment.” 204 Although no two state civil commitment laws are identical,
197

422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT AND GUARDIANSHIP LAWS FOR PERSONS WITH A SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER 1 (2018),
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/4EC4A03001EB4E5BB5F649FE2D4F7802.ashx
[https://perma.cc/A6SX-8VDX].
199 Id.
200 Bhalla et al., supra note 193, at 345.
201 See Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh
411 U.S. 911 (1973).
202 For a detailed overview of case law on this subject, see Heather Gray, Constitutional
Considerations of Involuntary Commitment for Substance Use Disorder and Alcoholism, NAMSDL
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016), https://namsdl.org/wp-content/uploads/NAMSDL-News-September-212016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW9Z-G9K7].
203 Because such detention is civil, rather than criminal, the Supreme Court has held that individuals
subjected to involuntary civil detention for medical treatment “are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982).
204 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Ali John Amirshahi, Civil Commitment for Drug Dependency: The
Judicial Response, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 47 (1992) (citing Donahue v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health,
632 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (D.R.I. 1986)).
198
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they generally specify that the purpose of involuntary civil commitment is to
ensure that the individual receives the medical treatment he or she needs.205
The length of time that an individual may be involuntarily committed
for treatment varies, ranging from three days to one year. 206 Importantly,
though, many state civil commitment laws have a maximum time limit for
involuntary civil commitment. 207 This raises the question: what happens
when a medical professional believes that an individual is in need of further
treatment, but the statutory time limit for civil commitment has been
reached? Several jurisdictions permit the state to keep the individual detained
in civil commitment if a court orders that additional treatment is necessary.208
Many do not, permitting the individual to leave civil commitment even if he
or she still suffers from substance abuse or mental health issues. 209
Like involuntary hospitalization statutes, mandatory migrant detention
statutes are, on paper, civil. But analogizing migrant detention to involuntary
hospitalization reveals significant differences. The extent of state
involvement is a telling feature. Whereas migrant detention involves
significant state resources to detain and house migrants for long periods of
time, involuntary hospitalization involves the state only for procedural
issues. 210 This also speaks to the physical reality of the detention: migrants
are detained in DHS jails, whereas individuals suffering from substance
abuse are committed to hospitals. The former, closely resembling actual
criminal incarceration, is a far cry from the latter, which amounts to medical
care.
Furthermore, the purpose for the detention is another instructive
touchpoint of this analogy. State civil commitment laws exist “to provide the

205 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (2018) (stating that the civil commitment “shall be for
the purpose of inpatient care for the treatment of an alcohol or substance use disorder in a facility licensed
or approved by the department of public health or the department of mental health”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.2-809 (2016) (specifying that a medical professional must assert that the individual “is in need of
hospitalization or treatment” for such a petition to be granted); see also John E.B. Myers, Involuntary
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 401 (1984)
(“[T]he governmental purposes are the protection of society and the provision of treatment designed to
alleviate suffering and return the patient to a fulfilling life in the community.”).
206 NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 1.
207 HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND., INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT FOR SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDERS (2017), https://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/education/bcr/addiction-research/involuntarycommitment-edt-717 [https://perma.cc/HD2P-UHM5].
208 Id. (“After the maximum period of ‘detention’ ends, and if the court does not order additional
treatment, individuals are released.”).
209 Id.
210 See supra notes 200–204 and accompanying text.
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individual with treatment, not punishment,” 211 and the practice of involuntary
hospitalization is true to this purpose, with hospitals and medical staff
providing treatment for the illness. On the contrary, although the stated
purpose of migrant detention is custodial, 212 the actual practice of migrant
detention does not hew closely to this purpose. Migrant detention does
accomplish this custodial goal, but it also goes far beyond it, acting as a
performative deterrent to future migrants. 213 As such, the actual purpose of
these two forms of detention are dissimilar.
These two subjects are also dissimilar on the standard for confinement.
The state must clear a high bar to commit an individual to involuntary
hospitalization. 214 This standard is clearly civil in nature because the state is
only looking to permit such hospitalization when it is in the best interests of
the individual’s health or to address a direct and present threat to others’
safety. As such, the standard for confinement that renders involuntary
hospitalization civil rather than criminal does not resemble the standard of
confinement for migrant detention, which is an extremely low bar of merely
asking whether the migrant falls under one of the categories identified in the
statute. 215 This standard looks to the state’s interests rather than the
individual’s and does not allow for an individualized assessment. Thus, they
more closely resemble criminal incarceration standards. 216
Lastly, civil commitment and migrant detention are not analogous in
terms of length of detention and, more importantly, the process for receiving
review. Nearly all state statutes permitting civil commitment have a
maximum length of confinement.217 But more importantly, even in states that
permit indefinite civil commitment, the individual may not be indefinitely
detained without a hearing. 218 This process of requiring regular hearings to
211

Hafemeister & Amirshahi, supra note 204, at 47.
Ryo, supra note 22, at 238 (“Immigration detention in the U.S. is civil confinement for which the
officially stated purpose is to facilitate the removal of individuals who do not have permission to remain
in the country.”).
213 See id. at 239.
214 The individual must be dangerous to himself or others or must be incapable of caring for his own
needs with the help of family and friends. See NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at
1.
215 See Lutz, supra note 14 (identifying the categories of migrants that are subject to mandatory
detention).
216 Arguably, the mandatory detention provision is worse than many provisions of the criminal
sentencing guidelines, which, aside from provisions prescribing mandatory minimum sentences, are
largely nonbinding guidelines that require judges to consider an individual’s criminal history and personal
circumstances when ordering a sentence for a criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
217 See NAT’L JUDICIAL OPIOID TASK FORCE, supra note 198, at 1.
218 HAZELDEN BETTY FORD FOUND., supra note 207.
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authorize continued involuntary detention is exactly what migrants are
denied. There is no process providing a migrant with periodic review or bond
hearings under the statute, at which the migrant may challenge his or her
detention. 219 Overall, comparing the length of detention and process (or lack
thereof) of challenging indefinite detention demonstrates that mandatory
detention under the immigration statutes is importantly dissimilar to civil
commitment for substance abuse or mental illness.
Although the power of the government was and is not as plenary in
either of the situations to which this Note analogizes as it is in American
immigration law, the difference is less salient than it may seem. The lack of
plenary power in these other contexts does not materially change what we
can learn from them. This Note draws on these analogies to help modern
readers and lawyers understand what has traditionally been considered
permissive civil detention in Anglo-American history. Each analogy carries
with it lessons that we can apply to modern immigration detention. The
debtors’ prison analogy demonstrates that the length of detention, physical
reality of detention, penal nature of detention (even if technically a
“coercive” form of detention), and degree of government involvement beg
the question of whether detention is truly “civil.” Likewise, the substance
abuse analogy informs us that a time limit or process for challenging
prolonged detention is a hallmark of civil detention, and that we should be
mindful of whether the use of detention is tailored to its purpose—in that
analogy, coercive detention to force individuals to seek medical attention.
The effect of the plenary power in American immigration law is that
courts engage in limited and highly deferential review of the actions of the
political branches, namely the actions of the executive branch and the laws
of Congress, but this deference will not keep the issue from the Supreme
Court. The dissenting Justices in Jennings and Preap are prepared to address
the constitutional issue even in light of the plenary power, and the author of
the majority opinions in those cases—Justice Alito—has signaled that the
Court is receptive to addressing the constitutional issue. 220 Justice Thomas
appears to be the only sitting Justice with a firm view that these statutes—
read in context of the plenary power—largely preclude judicial review of
immigration decisions. 221 This Note now turns to an examination of where
219 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (“[N]either provision can reasonably be read
to limit detention to six months.”).
220 See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.
221 Daniel L. Kaplan, Neil Gorsuch: A Preliminary Assessment, 33 CRIM. JUST. 27, 28 (2019) (noting
that in Jennings v. Rodriguez, “Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence expressing the view
that the Act barred any court from taking jurisdiction to address the question . . . [b]ut . . . notably declined
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the law of indefinite detention of migrants ought to develop in light of the
Court’s jurisprudence and these analogies.
IV. APPLICATIONS TO THE CIVIL DETENTION OF MIGRANTS
The Supreme Court will eventually need to address the constitutionality
of the provisions permitting indefinite civil detention of migrants. 222 While
no analogy can equip us with all of the wisdom necessary to handle the issue
of indefinite detention of migrants, the analogies in Part III impart lessons
that transcend time and context—lessons that help us grapple with the
permissiveness of the mandatory detention provisions of American
immigration law.
From the above analogies, this Note has identified four features central
to the inquiry of distinguishing civil from criminal detention: (1) length of
detention; (2) level of government involvement in detention; (3) physical
reality of detention; and, most importantly, (4) purpose of detention. In
scrutinizing these features of detention in the American immigration context,
this Note argues that these four features turn a difference in degree into a
difference in kind, rendering the indefinite civil detention of migrants
functionally criminal detention. The Supreme Court has made such
functional findings before, ruling that “though [some statutes] may be civil
in form, [they] are in their nature criminal.” 223 It should do so again.
It is true that the Supreme Court has addressed the difference between
civil and criminal detention and condoned the use of civil detention in the
immigration context. 224 A skeptical reader might therefore consider this issue
closed. But the modern world is very different from that of Mr. Wing. It is
unwise to blindly apply the holding of Wong Wing without considering how
circumstances have changed since 1896.

to join a footnote in which Justice Thomas hinted that the Act might contain a still more sweeping
preclusion of judicial review of immigration decisions”).
222 In Preap, the Supreme Court acknowledged that litigants may raise a head-on constitutional
challenge to mandatory detention provisions, reserving that question for another day. Nielsen v. Preap,
139 S. Ct. 954, 972 (2019). Meanwhile, the dissenting opinions reached the constitutional question.
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (finding that a civil state statute was
functionally a criminal statute because it compelled the production of an individual’s private papers and
records to the government in order to establish a criminal charge, constituting an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
224 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (establishing that noncitizens subject
to criminal proceedings must receive the constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
but permitting nonpunitive civil detention of noncitizens to effectuate removal).
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The Court in Wong Wing thought “it clear that [civil] detention, or
temporary confinement,” in order to effectuate removal is valid. 225 In that
case, however, the challenged statute actually contained a time limit of one
year. 226 The modern mandatory civil detention statutes contain no such time
limit. 227 Unlike Mr. Wing, whose civil detention would certainly terminate
after one year, migrants subjected to the modern mandatory detention
provisions face much lengthier, indefinite terms of detention. 228 It is time for
a fresh look at whether these provisions truly create civil, not criminal,
detentions.
Beginning with the first feature—length of detention—the criminal
nature of these provisions is most obviously gleaned from their lack of time
limits and process for challenging indefinite detention. One of the primary
lessons learned from the study of debtors’ prisons is that if detention is to be
civil, it demands a time limit. English debtors were consigned to detention
indefinitely, detained (ostensibly by their creditors) until they agreed to pay
the debt. Due to their inability or unwillingness to pay their debts, English
debtors faced indefinite detention. 229 In contrast, the detention of individuals
suffering from addiction or mental illness requires a built-in time limit for
detention to truly be “civil.” Many state statutes permitting civil commitment
for substance abuse include a time limit on detention. 230 Furthermore, unlike
the debtors’ laws of Victorian England, current state civil commitment laws
that permit indefinite hospitalization beyond the statutory maximum
prescribe process that affords the hospitalized individual with periodic
hearings to challenge the prolonged hospitalization. 231
Indefinite detention of migrants is more closely analogous to detention
for debt than to the civil commitment of individuals suffering from addiction
225

Id. at 235.
“That any such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and adjudged to be not
lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not
exceeding one year and thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided.” Act of
May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25, 25 (emphasis added) (repealed 1943).
227 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c) (2012).
228 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 860 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The record shows
that the Government detained some asylum seekers for 831 days (nearly 2 & [a half] years), 512 days,
456 days, 421 days, 354 days, 319 days, 318 days, and 274 days—before they won their cases and
received asylum. It also shows that the Government detained one noncitizen for nearly four years after
he had finished serving a criminal sentence, and the Government detained other members of this class for
608 days, 561 days, 446 days, 438 days, 387 days, and 305 days—all before they won their cases and
received relief from removal.” (citations omitted)).
229 See Kercher, supra note 163.
230 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
231 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226
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or mental illness. Regarding length of detention, Justice Breyer observed that
the government detained some migrants for years before they eventually won
their cases. 232 The government even detained one migrant for nearly four
years after he had finished serving a criminal sentence. 233 And regarding the
process for periodic review of indefinite detention, the Court in Jennings
expressly held that the mandatory detention provisions cannot be read in a
manner that permits such periodic review. 234 On this feature, migrant
detention is more closely analogous to imprisonment for debt than
involuntary hospitalization, and the Supreme Court should look to the history
of debtors’ prisons for guidance. 235
Thus, at a minimum, civil detention requires periodic review, and
should more generally require a firm end point unless the government can
show that continued detention is necessary and provide the detained
individual with periodic hearings to challenge the detention. Scholars and
amici who support the mandatory detention provisions as “civil” statutes
misunderstand this. Writing in support of the government in Jennings, amici
contended that “[d]etention pending completion of removal proceedings
always has an identifiable endpoint.” 236 But this is no more true now than it
was for Mr. Mezei. 237 Mr. Rodriguez, the subject of the class action who had
been detained for three years under the INA provisions before finally filing
a habeas petition, would surely say otherwise. 238 As would Mr. Mezei, who
would have spent the rest of his life languishing in indefinite detention on
Ellis Island but for the good graces of President Eisenhower. 239
History informs us that detention without a time limit or process for
periodic hearings to challenge prolonged detention is “penal
imprisonment.” 240 In some instances, indefinite detention under the
mandatory detention provisions is a fate perhaps even worse than a criminal
232

Id. at 860.
Id.
234 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
235 To be clear, the claim is not that detention is unconstitutional simply because it is indefinite, but
that it is criminal because it is indefinite without periodic review.
236 Brief for 29 U.S. Representatives et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Jennings,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204).
237 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing statistics on the lengthy detention
of migrants with no clear end point); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 220
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[Mr. Mezei] seems likely to be detained indefinitely, perhaps for
life . . . .”).
238 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838.
239 Mr. Mezei had been detained on Ellis Island for nearly four years but was quietly released in 1954
when the Eisenhower Administration closed Ellis Island. Serrano, supra note 12.
240 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
233
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sentence. 241 Defendants convicted of a crime stand before a judge who reads
them their sentence. 242 Before they even begin technically serving their term
of imprisonment, they are given notice of the maximum term for which they
will be imprisoned. 243 That is not the case for migrants detained under the
mandatory detention provisions of the INA. 244 As written, the provisions of
American immigration law authorizing the indefinite “civil” detention of
migrants are a “transparent fiction,” 245 and no amount of civil gloss—from
Congress or the courts—can change that. Only a time limit or process
affording periodic hearings to challenge continued detention can. Without
such limitations, these provisions are functionally criminal.
Second, the degree of government involvement can help us distinguish
civil from criminal detention. Debtors’ prisons implicated an enormous
amount of state involvement and state resources. Although the detention was
civil on paper, the English government supplied the infrastructure for such
confinement. The government supplied the prisons, prison guards, and all
attending resources necessary to detain debtors. 246 In contrast, the
government is minimally involved in the confinement of individuals who
suffer from substance abuse. The government’s involvement is limited to a
judge assenting to a medical professional’s assessment that an individual
must be committed to effectuate treatment.247 The individual is then
hospitalized rather than imprisoned. 248
Thus, comparing imprisonment for debt with involuntary
hospitalization teaches us that heavy government involvement in the
management of detainees is an indicator that detention is not civil, but rather
criminal. With migrant detention, the degree of government involvement and
state resources is even greater than in debtors’ prisons. The Department of
241

Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 865–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the treatment of indefinitely
detained migrants as perhaps even worse than that of ordinary defendants charged with crimes).
242 Sentencing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/sentencing
[https://perma.cc/PR6J-EQ2F].
243 Id. Criminal defendants who are detained in pretrial detention typically have that time credited
toward their term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2012).
244 HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 18
(2019).
245 This term is borrowed from a 1869 debate in Parliament about a debt imprisonment bill. 197 Parl
Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 572.
246 Or, the government contracted out this work to private companies to perform this service on
behalf of the state. See White, supra note 165, at 71, 73.
247 See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
248 See Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 PSYCHIATRY 30, 31
(2010) (detailing the process of hospitalization as civil confinement for individuals suffering from various
illnesses, including substance abuse).
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Homeland Security supplies the detention facilities, staffs them with agents
of the state, and supplies resources necessary to detain these migrants. 249 The
degree of government involvement in the detention of migrants is so great
that much of the work is actually outsourced to the private sector. 250 The
degree of government involvement in the detention of migrants under the
mandatory detention provisions is far more robust than the degree of
government involvement in the debtors’ prisons of Victorian England. 251
Third, the physical reality of detention is helpful in discerning civil
from criminal detention. The Court should rule that these provisions are
functionally criminal because migrant detention centers are indistinguishable
from prisons. Private prison corporations and county correctional
departments operate over 70% of these detention facilities. 252 As migrant
advocates demonstrate, the facilities that incarcerate immigrants under these
provisions operate under a penal model. 253 The conditions inside are virtually
indistinguishable from conventional prisons. Armed guards process
immigrants, taking their clothing and belongings and issuing them a prison
jumpsuit. 254 The physical reality of debtors’ prisons is instructive on this
point. In 1869, Members of Parliament commented extensively on the
wretched conditions of debtors’ prisons. 255 This supplied an additional reason
for abolishing debtors’ prisons through the Debtors Act of 1869. Today’s
Court should not avert its eyes from the reality of migrant detention centers:
249 The Department of Homeland Security touted this as one of its funding priorities, highlighting
that the 2019 DHS budget includes $2.8 billion for detention beds as part of its expanding effort to enforce
immigration laws. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 4 (2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KN9C-WN5A].
250 Esther Fung, Donald Trump Has Been Very Good for Publicly Listed Prison Owners, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-has-been-very-good-for-publicly-listedprison-owners-11551189601?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8CAK-YERH]. For data on the
skyrocketing numbers of detained migrants, see Allison Crennen-Dunlap, Abolishing the ICEberg,
96 DENV. L. REV. 148, 155 (2019), which asserts that: “Since 1996, the population of migrant detainees
has tripled, and the U.S. now operates the world’s largest immigration detention system.” This closely
resembles the practice of imprisonment for debt, in which the British government contracted out much of
this work to the private sector in order to accommodate the scale of detention. See White, supra note 165
and accompanying text.
251 Ware, supra note 160, at 352–53 (stating that approximately 10,000 Englishmen were detained
for debt annually by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries).
252 Clyde Haberman, For Private Prisons, Detaining Immigrants Is Big Business, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/us/prisons-immigration-detention.html [https://perma.cc
/V39U-V4VA].
253 Brief for Advancement Project, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 33–34, Nielsen
v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (No. 16-1363).
254 Id.
255 See 195 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 173.
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if it looks like a prison, operates like a prison, and literally smells like a
prison, the incarceration cannot be characterized as anything other than
imprisonment. 256
To be sure, individuals suffering from substance abuse by no means
have an easy go with involuntary hospitalization. The pain and anguish that
accompany substance abuse—and its treatment via hospitalization—are
real. 257 Individuals suffering from substance abuse battle not only their inner
suffering but also the physical manifestations of addiction and withdrawal,
which in many cases can prove fatal. But this suffering is not inflicted by the
state. This suffering is a result of the disease itself.
Detention for any reason is uncomfortable. On this third feature—the
physical reality of detention—the relevant question is what is inflicting that
discomfort. Asking this question of the indefinite detention of migrants
yields a clear answer: the United States is causing this discomfort through
the wretched conditions of migrant detention centers.
The fourth feature relevant to discerning civil from criminal
detention—the purpose of detention—is the most difficult to analyze.
Through the above analogies, this Note has examined forms of detention that
serve specific purposes, namely custodial detention, coercive detention, and
penal detention. The stated purpose of any given form of detention ought to
be scrutinized. Was detention in a debtors’ prison truly a form of coercive
detention, serving the purpose of forcing debtors to pay their debts?
Parliament said no. 258 Although detention for debt ostensibly served the
purpose of coercion, it was functionally penal. Civil confinement for
substance abuse is likewise muddled on this feature. Individuals suffering
from substance abuse are involuntarily hospitalized for a purpose that is
some mix of custody and coercion: the suffering individual needs to be
supervised (custodial detention) and forced to undergo medical treatment
(coercive detention).
Indefinite detention of migrants does not map neatly onto the
framework of custodial detention, coercive detention, or penal detention. The
stated purpose of migrant detention is custodial: the United States detains
migrants in order to facilitate their removal from the country. 259 In reality, it
256

See Dickerson, supra note 27.
See generally Sana Loue, The Criminalization of the Addictions: Toward a Unified Approach,
24 J. LEGAL MED. 281 (2003) (discussing the physical and mental suffering that accompanies addiction
as well as the efficacy of treatment through involuntary civil commitment).
258 See 197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 572; 197 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 421;
194 Parl Deb HC (3d ser.) (1869) col. 776.
259 See Ryo, supra note 22, at 238.
257
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is also coercive: the relevant statutes mandate detention in order to force
migrants to appear for their legal proceedings. 260
In the wake of Jennings, legal scholars have argued that migrant
detention actually serves a penal purpose, namely the “criminalization of
Mexican and Central American immigrants.” 261 Unlike the members of
today’s Court, Supreme Court Justices from over a century ago were more
inclined to recognize aspects of the immigration system as penal rather than
civil. 262 In addressing the broader question of whether deportation itself is
penal, Justice Brewer, dissenting in Fong Yue Ting, stated that “it needs no
citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is
punishment.” 263 Justice Field, the creator of the plenary power doctrine, also
dissented in Fong Yue Ting, expressing what one scholar called “outrage at
the majority’s willingness to leave whatever constitutional protections a
noncitizen might hold to the whims of the political branches of
government.” 264 To be sure, Justices Brewer and Field did not live in a world
of robust detention of migrants. Fong Yue Ting was not decided against the
backdrop of thousands of noncitizens subjected to indefinite detention. But
given these Justices’ conviction that deportation is a criminal punishment, a
modern reader might infer that their reasoning (and outrage) would likewise
apply to the widespread indefinite detention of migrants. Detention to
facilitate punishment should itself be understood to be punishment. Sadly,
the proposition that deportation and migrant detention serve a penal purpose
is in retreat. As the same scholar notes, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions
in Jennings and Preap do “not go[] so far as to argue that detention and
deportation are a form of punishment,” as his nineteenth century
predecessors did. 265
Although that proposition is in retreat, this Note argues that it is true:
migrant detention serves a penal purpose, and is therefore punishment, which
renders it criminal rather than civil. As far back as Wong Wing v. United
States, the Supreme Court has recognized that immigration detention may

260

See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text.
Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary
Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 118, 137 (2018).
262 Crennen-Dunlap, supra note 250, at 101–02 (discussing how Justice Breyer’s views seem much
more moderate than Justice Brewer’s, Justice Field’s, and Chief Justice Fuller’s views espoused in
dissenting opinions in the late nineteenth century).
263 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
264 Crennen-Dunlap, supra note 250, at 101.
265 Id. at 96.
261
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not be used for penal purposes. 266 This pronouncement continued through to
recent cases, such as Zadvydas and Demore, in which the Court assumed that
the indefinite detention provisions “are nonpunitive in purpose and effect,”267
and upheld one such provision “on the basis of its non-punitive purposes.”268
These assumptions are wrong. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumptions,
these provisions are punitive in nature because “imposing mandatory
detention appears to have little purpose but to punish an individual on the
basis of a crime for which she has already served her criminal sentence—an
outcome that would be difficult or impossible to reconcile with the
commands of the Constitution.” 269 Functionally, these provisions impose
mandatory detention without trial by jury and other constitutional
protections.
This Note also finds that migrant detention serves a fourth purpose
which may be far more perverse than custodial, coercive, or penal detention:
theatrical detention. 270 The President has weaponized migrant detention for
political profit and general migration deterrence. In August of 2019, the
Trump Administration unveiled a new regulation to replace the Flores
Settlement, which was an agreement between the Clinton Administration
and immigration activists that mandated a minimum level of care for migrant
children and placed a limit on how long the government could detain them. 271
The New York Times reports that “[t]he administration’s goal with the new
rule is deterrence, and its message to families fleeing Central America is
blunt: Come here and we will lock you up.” 272 President Trump stated this
himself, remarking that his Administration’s zero-tolerance policy is coming

266 163 U.S. 228, 243–44 (1896) (ruling that subjecting immigrants to imprisonment at hard labor
before removal violated the Constitution’s Due Process Clause).
267 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
268 Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17,
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (No. 16-1363); see also Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 518–19 (2003).
269 Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center, supra note 268, at 18–19 (citing Demore, 538 U.S.
at 518–19).
270 Historically, theatrical punishments such as stockades were used as a form of public shaming and
a deterrent. Brian Palmer, Can We Bring Back the Stockades? The Constitutionality of Public Shaming,
SLATE (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:37 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/11/public-shamingsentences-can-judges-subject-criminals-to-humiliation.html [https://perma.cc/V2NA-QJ5R].
271 Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face Indefinite Detention
Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21
/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention.html [https://perma.cc/QY5H-HQ9Z].
272 Id.
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together “like[] a beautiful puzzle.” 273 Migrant detention is no longer merely
custodial, coercive, and penal—it is performative. “[W]hen they see you
can’t get into the United States,” or what happens upon arrival, the President
will have accomplished his goal of using migrant detention as a general
deterrent against future migrants. 274 The message is clear: the drawbridge is
up, the country is closed, and if a migrant still manages to enter the United
States, they will languish away in migrant detention. 275
In calling for the Court to recognize the mandatory detention provisions
as functionally criminal, this Note appears to be calling for a radical
departure from case law. But in light of the features underlying the Court’s
past decisions in this area, it is not so radical as it seems. While the Court
has continued to assume such detentions are civil, it has not meaningfully
analyzed how the circumstances and realities of modern immigration
detention affect this label. 276 And even if the Supreme Court continues to
read these provisions as civil provisions, the above analogies are still helpful
in understanding the permissiveness of civil detention.
CONCLUSION
This Note traces the history of the regulation of immigration in the
United States and the current civil detention regime in American
immigration law. In doing so, this Note examines the evolution of the plenary
power. With Jennings and Preap, the Supreme Court has had two
273 Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-60/
[https://perma.cc/3BJ7-WQH9].
274 Id.
275 In a prescient letter to the editor from the month Ellis Island closed, one contemporary noted that
the “plight [of migrants moved from civil detention on Ellis Island to civil detention in other facilities] is
exactly the same as if they were common criminals.” Pearl S. Buck, Letter to the Editor, Plight of
Immigrants: Closing of Ellis Island Said to Work Hardship on New Arrivals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 1954)
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/11/16/96507313.pdf (last visited Mar, 27, 2020).
This contemporary was concerned about the effect of treating migrants as criminals. “I am sure that the
American people would not want this to happen.” Id. Her concerns—raised in 1954—ring true today
regarding the effect on America’s standing on the world stage. “[I]t is inevitable that news of such
treatment will go abroad and serve as bad propaganda for our country.” Id.
276 As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that immigration-related detention is
not criminal punishment. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). Troublingly, the Court
continues to cite to Wong Wing v. United States in support of this. The circumstances and realities of
immigration-related detention have changed drastically since 1896. As one scholar argues, the expanded
use of migrant detention that resembles criminal incarceration has contributed to the significant overlap
between criminal and immigration law, also known as “crimmigration.” Stumpf, supra note 51, at 376
(“Immigration law today is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between them
has grown indistinct.”).
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opportunities to rule on the indefinite civil detention of migrants since the
beginning of the Trump Administration. As the practice of indefinite civil
detention becomes more pronounced, the Supreme Court will eventually
need to weigh in on the constitutionality of this facet of American
immigration law. Two analogies—debtors’ prisons in early modern England
and involuntary civil commitment of individuals suffering from substance
abuse—provide both historical and modern perspectives on the
permissiveness of civil detention. Drawing on history and function, this Note
has argued that the Supreme Court should rule that the mandatory detention
provisions are functionally criminal, despite their civil label. While such a
ruling would not be without precedent, 277 it is a tall order in light of the
centuries of case law treating these detention provisions as civil provisions
and denying migrants the right to a bond hearing.
In exploring this civil/criminal distinction, this Note has sought to tell
the stories of those affected by civil detention, who have been treated like
criminals without any of the attending rights of the criminally accused. Two
years into his detention on Ellis Island, Ignatz Mezei penned a short letter to
a federal judge in New York. “Let me go free,” he pleaded. “I did not kill
anybody, I did not steal anybody, I did not make any crime.” 278 It is time for
the Supreme Court to answer his plea.

277
278

See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Serrano, supra note 12.
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